Admiral Mike Mullen travels to Afghanistan and Pakistan; generals Kayani and Pasha are headed towards Kabul — in the midst of the flurry of high-level visits in the region, the strategic incoherence seems to keep growing. Afghanistan is an odd puzzle at the moment. While the American troops on the ground are armed with a COIN strategy, the policymakers in the US are questioning the wisdom of the strategy in the first place and troops on the ground in Afghanistan are chafing against the restrictions that COIN imposes in terms of militarily engaging the enemy. In the midst of this is a president, Hamid Karzai, who is supposed to be pivotal to the success of COIN but is actively pushing for some kind of quick settlement with his Taliban opponents. And all of that before Pakistan enters the frame. The army top brass here is believed to have quietly conveyed its dismay over the sacking of Gen McChrystal, a man who was considered to be someone that Pak-istan could do business with. Yet, the importance of the sacking of Gen McChrystal should not be overestimated: Adm Mullen and Gen Petraeus are well-known personalities in Islamabad and GHQ and are familiar with the key players here.
The problem for Pakistan, as opposed to the army specifically, is that the generals here may be tempted to draw the wrong conclusions from the increasing uncertainty over the future of Afghanistan. Trying to broker an agreement between President Karzai and the Haqqanis, or even with the ultimate power broker in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, is a non-starter because Karzai has little power of his own and the Americans are still opposed to talking at this stage. But it is an idea that the army has quietly pressed for some time now and probably feels encouraged to ramp up in the wake of the McChrystal debacle, which exposed the level of acrimony and discord within the Obama administration’s Afghan team. This is worrying. A decade since the events of 9/11, what was already apparent to some should be apparent to everyone: a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan (which is what the army here claims it wants) can never be achieved if certain paths are still pursued.
Pakistan’s overriding goal at the present time should be the internal security of this country. This means dealing with the militant groups inside the country and helping fashion an Afghanistan that does not pose a threat to Pakistan. And for those who pine for a ‘solution’ in Afghanistan like that of the mid ’90s, a simple question: how exactly did that end up strengthening Pakistan’s security?
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