Editoral-Afghan war’s tipping point

THE contours of a confused end to the war in Afghanistan can be discerned now. After the failure of the operation in Marja, Helmand, the much-hyped operation in Kandahar may not prove more than a military exercise undertaken for the benefit of US voters to show that something far-reaching is being accomplished, the reality, of course, being very different.

President Hamid Karzai has lost faith in his western supporters and has accused the West of instigating the attack on the recent loya jirga that he had summoned in Kabul to reach the Taliban. He also accused two important officials of his government for “being agents of the US and Nato”. Both Amrullah Saleh, the director of the Afghan Intelligence Service and the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, resigned from their jobs recently.

If there was ever any doubt about Karzai’s intentions, these actions clearly show that he has decided to worry about his future rather than fight the Taliban at the behest of his allies. He is a most astute man. He has realised the futility of investing more goodwill in an enterprise that is failing. It is thus unlikely that Karzai will permit the Afghan National Army or the Afghan police to operate jointly with US or Nato forces except in unimportant operations.

As a matter of fact, Karzai would have already opened a channel with the Taliban by now to ensure that there is no mishap before he has succeeded in reaching a settlement with them. Will he succeed? Lessons from Afghan history and the nature of the present Afghan war indicate that he will face great difficulty in his enterprise. Under these circumstances one can sympathise with Gen Stanley McChrystal and other commanders because their projections and commitments made to the US Senate are going up in smoke. The US is severely handicapped and cannot do much without support from the Afghan national forces.

What are the implications of this change for Pakistan? Evidently it has put pressure on Pakistan to begin operations in North Waziristan. Secondly, Karzai’s reliance on Pakistan has increased because he needs help for finding a solution in Afghanistan.

This also temporarily improves Pakistan’s strategic position. If Karzai wants Pakistani assistance he has to distance himself from the Indians. As a matter of fact the resignation of Saleh suits the ISI very well as it considered him to be pro-Indian and one of India’s supporters in the ongoing conflict in Fata and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Moreover, it is clear that Mr Karzai needs political capital to influence the hostile forces in Afghanistan; with US power compromised, his only insurance from now till 2011 when US forces are likely to be reduced will be Pakistan.

This new scenario creates an opportunity for Pakistan. For one there is going to be no North Waziristan operation as there is no longer any point in confronting the Haqqani network when conditions in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan are calm.

In Pakistan the military will have more freedom to operate against our homegrown insurgency. However, this will be a wild goose chase since we have not instituted reforms to benefit from such operations once the terrorists have been removed.

We have been woefully myopic about our strategy. Even after eight years of hard fighting we are none the wiser in our approach. Our governance remains terrible. Although we blame the terrorists for our misfortune yet we overlook the destruction caused to our people by collateral death and destruction of property. As our political and bureaucratic elite retire behind bomb-proof walls the field has been left open to criminals and the illegal activities of police including staged executions that are increasing daily.

Does it really matter to a poor, impoverished and disempowered Pakistani whether he loses his life to a terrorist strike or to state terrorism? Not really. The result is rising hate and prayers for punishment upon those who fail to protect the poor and weak.

A recent report by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation finds that 48 per cent of Pakistanis are suffering from food insecurity. According to another report recently published there has been a 10 per cent decline in wheat consumption as compared to a year ago. It means that the personal income of a substantial number of Pakistanis is declining since wheat is easily available in the market. This is a harrowing snapshot and should jerk our leaders into action.

The situation is worse in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because of the high poverty levels. Obviously, these outcomes are not the result of terrorists but our own inability to govern effectively. This analysis poses questions. Who in the eyes of the public is a greater threat to their lives — the terrorist or the state?

In order to win the initiative, urgent reforms are needed. In many ways we continue to be entangled in the mantra of the post-colonial model of development that seeks to transform societies into modern states by channelling investments into education, health and other basic needs.

In a state like ours, that has lost the trust of its citizenry, the priority must shift for at least the next two years towards social-protection governance and strategic communication. Although new opportunities are available because of Karzai’s manouevre, we will only benefit if we are able to capitalise on it quickly.

The writer is a former chief secretary of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

azizkhalid@gmail.com

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